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Abstract 
As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 
1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its 
currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks 
in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) 
decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their 
size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while 
assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. The 
CBU purchased about $416 million in non-performing loans, which were denominated in 
both local and foreign currency. The CBU funded the purchases by issuing $311 million in 
bonds and promissory notes (denominated in U.S. dollars) to the banks and writing off $105 
million in previous financial assistance to the banks. Instead of creating an asset 
management company to handle these non-performing assets, the CBU simply assumed the 
portfolios onto its balance sheet. This move resulted in a lack of transparency on loan 
recovery and discharge data, as well as several parliamentary and judicial investigations. 
Despite forming a National Office of Asset Recovery in 1984 to facilitate loan recovery, the 
CBU likely wrote off a sizeable portion of the non-performing portfolios every year as 
operating losses after loan recovery results proved disappointing.  




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
The beginning of the 1980s in Uruguay featured 
increasing interest rates, an overvaluing of the 
peso and steadily rising amounts of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, which led to 
substantial risk profiles inside the Uruguayan 
banking sector. When the devaluation of the 
Argentine peso occurred in March 1981, 
investors abandoned Uruguay, assuming that a 
similar devaluation could follow in the 
neighboring country. This led to a decline in 
asset prices, which meant that the value of 
collateral on foreign currency-denominated 
bank loans dropped significantly (Pérez-
Campanero and Leone 1998). 
As this financial crisis rapidly intensified, 
eventually culminating in the devaluation of 
the Uruguayan peso in November 1982, five 
small- to medium-sized banks faced serious 
solvency issues in the beginning of 1982, as 
banks lacked sufficient liquidity to meet 
depositor withdrawals and previous 
government financial assistance failed to 
return the firms to solvency (Vaz 1988, 119). 
The Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) determined 
that these banks did not require a direct 
intervention and liquidation, as they were 
smaller and not necessarily a systemic risk. 
Instead, the CBU arranged for the sale of the 
banks to foreign financial institutions, while purchasing the non-performing portfolios of the 
failed banks in the process (Banda 1990). These portfolios were denominated in both 
Uruguayan pesos and U.S. dollars. 65.1% of the acquired portfolios were denominated in 
foreign currency. In order to finance the US$416 million portfolio purchase scheme, the CBU 
issued US$311 million in bonds and promissory notes, denominated in U.S. dollars, to the 
failed banks and wrote off US$105 million in previous financial assistance (Pérez-
Campanero and Leone 1998).  
Instead of creating a separate asset management company to take on the non-performing 
assets, the CBU assumed the purchased portfolios directly onto its balance sheet (Pérez-
Campanero and Leone 1998). These operations did not occur simultaneously but occurred 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: The CBU arranged the sale of local 
failed banks to foreign institutions, purchasing 
the non-performing portfolios in the process, in 
order to avoid “a banking panic and [ensure] the 
maintenance of the stability of the financial 
system” (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). 
 




Size and Type of 
NPL Problem 
30.4% in 1982 (Caprio and 
Klingebiel 1996) 
Concentrated in the livestock 
and industrial sector  
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible 
Institutions 
Five failed privately owned 
commercial banks 
Closed-bank only  
Usage US$416 million acquired by 
the Central Bank of Uruguay  
Outcomes Recovered 6.4% of the peso 
debt and 1.8% of the dollar 
debt as of end-1983  
Ownership 
Structure 
The CBU assumed the 




Did not involve the creation 
of an asset management 
company and paid for a 
portfolio partly denominated 
in local currency with long-
term dollar debt 
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on a case-by-case basis from April 1982 through early 1983 (Banda 1990). The CBU claimed 
that this approach allowed the central bank to spread the losses out over many years and 
recoup the financial assistance provided to the banks, as well as limit the possibility of a 
banking panic since the failed banks were sold rather than liquidated (Pérez-Campanero and 
Leone 1998).  
The CBU also acquired some non-performing assets from other commercial banks who 
agreed to lend the central bank foreign currencies to cover its foreign reserve shortage. Two 
foreign banks, Bank of America and Citibank, sold 58 percent of the loans that the CBU 
purchased under this program. These banks made significant capital gains since their 
portfolio purchase occurred a month before the devaluation of the Uruguayan peso while 
they simultaneously negotiated the Uruguayan external debt (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 
1998). However, this second operation is not the focus of this case study.  
The CBU did not indicate a designated timeframe within which they wanted to recover the 
loans. The administration of the portfolios shifted several times after the CBU purchased 
them, from the CBU, to the foreign banks that purchased the local banks, back to the CBU, to 
a state-owned bank, and finally to a recently nationalized commercial bank (Pérez-
Campanero and Leone 1998).  
Summary Evaluation 
Since the CBU assumed the non-performing portfolios onto its balance sheet, there is a lack 
of transparency in data regarding loan recovery and restructuring, with the last publicly 
released data on loan recovery coming at the end of 1984. For this reason, Pérez-Campanero 
and Lopez (1998, 329) state that “the long-term impact of this purchased portfolio on the 
accounts of the Central Bank of Uruguay is hard to assess.” 
Of the data available at the end of 1983, the CBU had recovered just NUr$409.9 million 
(6.4%) of the debt denominated in pesos and US$8.7 million (1.8%) of the debt in dollars. 
Loan recovery increased to NUr$724.5 million for the peso debt and US$13.7 million for the 
dollar debt by August 31, 1984, which is the final release of public data. Beyond 1984, Pérez-
Campanero and Leone (1998) claim that the CBU likely wrote off a portion of the portfolio 
every year, but the CBU did not confirm this. 
Pérez-Campanero and Leone (1998) cite four major reasons for poor loan recovery results: 
1) continued debtor insolvency; 2) a refusal to pay by debtors favoring loan amnesty; 3) a 
weak judicial system that favored borrowers; 4) a hope that better future economic 
conditions which would increase the value of collateral. 
In the wake of poor recovery of non-performing portfolios in Uruguay, additional domestic 
banks became insolvent and were taken over by a government-owned bank, leading to 
government-owned banks holding 75% of deposits by 1987. In response, Uruguay passed 
the Domestic Debt Refinancing Law in November 1985, which attempted to create a legal 
framework for alleviating the debt burden of viable firms. This law created the Financial 
Analysis Commission, which facilitated the rescheduling of debt and had the ability to 
liquidate firms and halt dividends (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
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Some in Parliament and the judiciary found irregularities in the portfolio purchasing scheme 
and questioned the unique structure of the intervention. In particular, the usage of long-term 
dollar debt to purchase portfolios partly denominated in pesos drew criticism (Pérez-
Campanero and Leone 1998).  
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Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme: Uruguay Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$9.179 billion in 1982 
$5.102 billion in 1983 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$3,107 in 1982 
$1,716 in 1983 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Size of banking system 
 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Government ownership of banking system 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Data not available for 
1982  
Data not available for 
1983 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The CBU purchased portfolios of non-performing assets from 
insolvent institutions in order to facilitate their sale to healthy institutions.  
The CBU purchased non-performing loans from five small- to medium-sized banks that had 
failed, with the issuance of bonds and write-off of previous financial assistance, and then 
assisted in the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions (Pérez-Campanero and 
Leone 1998). This operation is the focus of this case study, as it was intended to remove 
problematic loans from the banking sector to prevent financial instability.  
A second type of operation, which is not the focus of this case study, functioned instead as a 
solution to the CBU’s shortage of foreign reserves. Under this operation, the CBU used 
promissory notes to purchase portfolios with at least two-thirds of the loans classified as 
good quality and, in return, banks lent foreign reserves to the CBU.3 Although the CBU 
bought portfolios with some non-performing loans, that was not the sole purpose of this 
operation, but rather a bargaining chip. Foreign banks, specifically Citibank and Bank of 
America, were the primary sellers of these portfolios, at a disproportionate rate to their 
involvement in the Uruguayan banking sector (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). 
2. Legal Authority: Decreto-Ley No. 15322 provided ex post facto justification for 
the portfolio purchase scheme.  
Vaz (1988) states that the CBU utilized Decreto-Ley No. 15322, passed in September 1982, 
as ex post facto justification for the portfolio purchase scheme, since the first bank 
intervention occurred in April 1982. In this new law on financial regulation, the CBU is 
allowed to sell bonds as well as promissory notes to financial institutions under its lender-
of-last-resort authority (Asamblea General de Uruguay 1982). 
The Parliament, comptroller, and the courts all initiated investigations into the legality of 
the portfolio purchase scheme. The CBU’s lawyers claimed that the pre-existing law was 
vague on purpose, which encouraged the CBU to enjoy widespread powers (Vaz 1988). It is 
unclear if the investigations resulted in any tangible results or punishments.  
 
3 The CBU could have potentially raised foreign reserves through a sale of its gold, but it appears that foreign 
banks, specifically Citibank and Bank of America, pushed for the implemented operation. Citibank and Bank of 
America were also negotiating Uruguay’s external debt at the same time, which Pérez-Campanero and Leone 
point out as suspicious and possibly the reason for the structure of this operation (Pérez-Campanero and 
Leone 1998). 
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3. Special Powers: The CBU does not appear to have had any special powers, but as 
loan recovery stagnated and debt burdens increased, Uruguay ultimately 
adopted debt-refinancing legislation 
Since the CBU assumed the non-performing loan portfolios onto its balance sheet rather than 
create a separate asset management company, there do not appear to be any special powers 
involved in this scheme.  
The CBU struggled to recover a significant portion of the non-performing assets likely as a 
result of this lack of special powers to address delinquency. However, as loan recovery 
stagnated and debt burdens increased, the Uruguayan government responded with the 
Domestic Debt Refinancing Law in November 1985, which sought to alleviate the debt 
burdens of viable firms and allow for the rescheduling of debt to allow for more borrowing. 
The law created the Financial Analysis Commission, which served as the authority in 
classifying and evaluating debtors under the new law. The commission had the power to 
liquidate assets if the debtor became delinquent for over six months, as well as the ability to 
halt dividends until the debt was reduced by two-thirds. The commission also determined if 
a debtor qualified as a viable firm and was thus eligible for the automatic refinancing 
provisions included in the Domestic Debt Refinancing Law (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 
1998). 
4. Mandate: The CBU portfolio purchase scheme allowed five failed local banks to 
avoid bankruptcy and sought to recover outstanding debts from the acquired 
portfolios. 
The CBU intended the non-performing portfolio purchase scheme as a method to avoid a 
direct intervention into the failed banks (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
5. Communication: Information about the scheme appeared in several Uruguayan 
newspapers, but the final mention of loan recovery data occurred in 1984, before 
the full recovery or discharge of the assets. 
Many of the newspapers and magazines reporting on the portfolio purchase scheme are no 
longer in publication and do not have available digitized archives. However, Pérez-
Campanero and Leone (1998) cite heavily from local newspapers, which seemed to report 
detailed information on the announcement of the scheme and its progress. Pérez-
Campanero and Leone note that the CBU stopped releasing data on loan recovery efforts on 
November 11, 1984. Since the CBU simply took the non-performing portfolios onto its 
balance sheet, there is a lack of transparency into the accounting for individual loans and 
recovery process.  
6. Ownership structure: The purchase of loan portfolios by the CBU did not include 
the creation of a stand-alone asset management company, but rather, the CBU 
took the portfolios onto its own balance sheet. 
The CBU preferred the structure of the portfolio purchase paired with the sale of the failed 
banks to direct interventions by the central bank. The chosen approach allowed the CBU to 
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maintain some level of control and prevent further panic because the sales happened on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than having to schedule the direct intervention of the banks at 
the same time. Additionally, this strategy allowed the CBU to spread out the losses of the 
intervention across several years on its balance sheet, as well as recoup the financial 
assistance provided to the insolvent banks prior to the intervention (Pérez-Campanero and 
Leone 1998). 
7. Governance/Administration: The administration of these portfolios often 
changed, from delegation to the BROU (a state-owned bank), to assumption by 
the CBU, back to BROU, and, finally, to a nationalized commercial bank. 
The portfolios involved in this operation routinely changed hands within the government, 
since the CBU did not have the manpower or technical ability to deal with such large and 
complex portfolios. The CBU transferred the administration of its private sector loan 
portfolio, including the purchased non-performing assets, to the BROU, a state-owned bank, 
in 1988. Parliamentary and judicial investigations into the takeover deals occurred due to 
“irregularities” and the unique structure of the program; however, the outcome of such 
investigations was unclear (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
8. Size: There did not appear to be a cap on the amount of non-performing assets 
that the CBU could purchase, which ended up totaling $416 million. 
The portfolio purchase scheme did not limit the amount of assets that the CBU could assume, 
since the CBU assumed the entire non-performing portfolios of the banks on a case-by-case 
basis. In total, the CBU assumed $416 million in loan portfolios from the five failed banks 
(Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
9. Funding Source: The portfolio purchase scheme was government funded. 
 The CBU funded the portfolio purchase scheme through the issuance of bonds and 
promissory notes. Additionally, the CBU wrote off previous financial assistance provided to 
the failed banks in the form of loans (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). 
10. Eligible Institutions: The portfolio purchase scheme involved several failed 
commercial banks in the process of their sale to foreign financial institutions. 
The five failed commercial banks did not comprise a significant share of the banking sector, 
which explains why the CBU did not believe the situation warranted a direct intervention 
(Banda 1990). See Appendix A for information on each bank intervention.  
11. Eligible Assets: The CBU operation did not appear to have any limitations on 
eligible assets, as long as the assets were non-performing and owned by the five 
failed local banks.  
The CBU purchased the non-performing portfolios from the five failed local banks prior to 
their sale and did not appear to define what they considered eligible to be included in the 
non-performing portfolios (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). There does not appear to 
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be further information on the makeup and composition of the loan portfolios bought by the 
CBU. 
12. Acquisition – Mechanics: The CBU purchased loan portfolios through the issuance 
of $311 million in bonds and promissory notes, as well as the write-off of $105 
million in previous financial assistance.  
The CBU issued bonds and promissory notes, denominated in U.S. dollars, to pay for the 
acquired portfolios. The bonds issued by the CBU had a seven-year maturity, two-year grace 
period, and an interest rate of one and a half points above LIBOR. Additionally, the CBU 
wrote off $105 million in outstanding loans it had previously provided the failed local banks 
in an attempt to resolve their insolvency (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). 
The CBU used long-term dollar debt to purchase portfolios of non-performing loans 
partially denominated in pesos, which the CBU defended this decision by claiming that 
allowed the CBU to spread the monetary effects over several years and that banks refused 
to hold long-term peso debt. The president of the CBU said that offering a cash payment 
instead of long-term dollar debt would have just led to widespread purchase of dollars 
(Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998). 
13. Acquisition – Pricing: There is no available information on how the CBU priced 
the non-performing loan portfolios. 
It is unclear how the CBU determined the pricing of the portfolios purchased from the 
failed banks (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
14. Disposal: The CBU underestimated the level of unrecoverable loans and 
implemented several loan restructurings to encourage payment within the 
acquired portfolios. 
The CBU did not anticipate having as much difficulty recovering the loans in the portfolio as 
it did, which led to greater costs to the CBU. Several measures were taken in April 1984 to 
improve the recovery of assets in the loan portfolios. The government established the 
National Office of Asset Recovery to streamline the recovery process. Additionally, 
borrowers, regardless of which currency the debts were denominated in, were split into 
two categorizations: high-standard and low-standard borrowers. In order to be classified 
as a high-standard borrower, a borrower had to have paid at least 60% of interest accrued 
in six months of 1983 and would have paid 60% of the interest for the whole year of 1983 
by May 15, 1984 (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
High-standard borrowers received several benefits, with the first being a write-off of 20% 
(for local currency borrowers) and 40% (for foreign currency borrowers) of interest 
accrued in 1983. Second, the maturity periods were extended. Third, high-standard 
borrowers in local currency could convert their outstanding debt into indexed debt at a four 
percent interest rate, with the adjustment factor being the lower of the change in exchange 
rate or inflation rate. Finally, high-standard borrowers in foreign currency could similarly 
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convert their outstanding debts into local-currency indexed debt, under the same 
conditions as the borrowers in local currency (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
All borrowers that made a payment 180 days before the due date, if this occurred before 
September 30, 1984, were eligible to receive a write-off equivalent to the prepayment 
amount, for up to 25% of the debt outstanding before the prepayment. If the prepayment 
occurred after September 30, 1984, borrowers were eligible for a similar benefit, except the 
write-off could only equal 15% of the debt outstanding (Pérez-Campanero and Leone 1998).  
Although in-depth public data was not available on individual loan recovery, Pérez-
Campanero and Leone (1998) state that it is likely the CBU wrote off a sizeable portion of 
the loan portfolio every year as an operating loss. 
15. Timeframe: There was no announced timeframe for the portfolio purchase 
scheme and the CBU stopped providing loan recovery data in 1984. 
The CBU did not announce an intended end date for the disposal of the portfolios acquired 
from the five failed local banks. 
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Appendix 












Banco Central de 
Madrid 
15.9  Both 4/22/1982 
Banco de Litoral Banco Santander 173.1  US$ 
9/1982-
3/1983 
Banca Federada del 
Interior 
Banco Exterior de 
Madrid 
88  Both 10/1982 




Banco de Italia 27  US$ n/a 
Source: Banda 1990. 
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